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INTRODUCTION 
As an organisational format, charitable foundations are well positioned in an 
environment that increasingly requires all types of organisations to practically 
showcase their social responsibility (Breitbarth et al., 2015). It has been empirically 
evidenced, both outside (e.g., Herlin and Pedersen, 2013; Minefee et al. 2015) and 
inside the sporting domain (e.g., Kolyperas et al., 2016; Sparvero and Kent, 2014), 
that companies have formed charitable foundations for their philanthropic activities 
and community-based programmes. Indeed, this mode of governance for 
implementing corporate social responsibility (CSR) (see Husted, 2003) has now 
become the one most adopted by not only blue-chip companies across the world 
(Marquis and Lee, 2013), but also by the professional team sport organisations 
(Walzel, Robertson and Anagnostopoulos, 2018).  
Like other non-profit organisations, charitable foundations are governed 
through their board members (trusties in this case); that is, volunteers who are usually 
influential personalities who also possess specific professional capabilities and 
competences, which are not only essential skills for well-thought through CSR-based 
programmes (Bingham and Walters, 2013), but also a critical condition for the 
governance of contemporary sport organisations in general (Shilbury and Ferkins, 
2011). This need for constant modernisation (see Tacon and Walters, 2016) of non-
profit sport organisations (not least the charitable foundations in question) has brought 
new organisational actors – that is, paid professionals (referred to here as ‘foundation 
executive/CEO’) – whose presence inevitably perplexes board group dynamics 
(Anagnostopoulos and Shilbury, 2013; Schoenberg, Cuskelly and Auld, 2016).  
The purpose of this chapter is to unpack a specific type of board group 
dynamic – namely the board-executive relationship – in the context of the 
professional sport teams’ charitable foundations. More specifically, acknowledging 
that governance is a process-based exercise, the present study examines process 
elements apt to improve the charitable foundations’ perceived performance; that is, 
trust and ‘exchange currencies’ between the foundations’ executive/CEO and the 
board. Thus, the study examines organisational governance with an implicit focus of 
the board’s role on perceived organisational performance, rather than on conformance 
(Hoye et al., 2018; Shilbury, 2001).       
In doing so, the chapter makes a three-fold contribution to the sport 
governance literature. First, it draws on an organisational setting in which the 
boundaries between charitable foundation and ‘parent’ team are frequently ill-defined, 
thereby rendering board dynamics distinctive (Anagnostopoulos, Byers and 
Kolyperas, 2017). Such distinctiveness lies in that the composition of the board 
consists of members of the ‘parent’ sport team organisation; chief among which are 
often the owner/chairperson of the team and/or its CEO. Such an influential presence 
in the board from the ‘parent’ team’s perspective is neither incidental nor 
inexplicable. Above all, the charitable foundations are at least partially dependent on 
their founding teams and its network and human resources (Kolyperas et al., 2016). 
This dependency determines the impact on the beneficiaries (fans, partners etc.) from 
the community-oriented practices (COP) these charities undertake, which ultimately 
have a positive return on the brand (the team and the foundation as one organisational 
unit) in both social and business terms (see Figure 15.1).   
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Second, this study extends discussions in the extant sport governance literature 
regarding the critical role the concept of trust has in improving board processes. It 
does so by unpacking the concept’s main components and dimensions while 
providing empirical insights from the executive/CEO perspective. Third, it moves 
away from theoretical approaches that dominate (sport) governance literature and 
largely inform empirical studies on the matter (that is, agency-principal theory, 
managerial-hegemony theory, stewardship theory, stakeholder theory, resource-
dependency theory). As such, it draws on social exchange theory – and the concept of 
reciprocity – to empirically illustrate how trust building occurs by reporting specific 
‘exchange rates’ used by the executives/CEOs to influence the board, and ultimately 
gain its trust.   
Following this introduction, the next section briefly reports core literature 
related to board-executive relationship while justifying why social exchange theory is 
an appropriate theoretical lens to explain the relationship in question. The third 
section offers an account of the research design and the method used. Guided by two 
conceptual frameworks, the fourth section offers empirical insights into the charitable 
foundations’ executives perceived level of trust and the reciprocity-based tactics these 
executives use to influence the board in order for the organisation to enhance its social 
and business performance. The chapter concludes with implications and future 
research avenues.  
 
ORGANISATIONAL SPORT GOVERNANCE AND BOARD DYNAMICS 
The voluntary basis upon which sport organisations have been formed led scholarly 
activity on sport governance to commence by looking at organisational governance. 
This means examining the work of a sport organisation’s board and its processes to 
understand whether and how they affect the performance of the organisation as a 
whole (Hoye and Doherty, 2011). This examination mostly afforded attention to 
board member interactions (‘group dynamics’ as per Hoye and Doherty (2011), or 
‘intragroup dynamics’ as per Schoenberg, Cuskelly and Auld (2016)) that describe the 
underlying social relationships that influence the way a group (in our case, the board) 
behaves (Robbins, 2011). Schoenberg et al. (2016, p. 2) stated that: 
 
An intragroup dynamic (e.g., cohesion, board-CEO relationship, power pattern, 
conflict etc.) is a shared characteristic of a group that results from group interaction 
and cannot be structurally regulated, enforced, or implemented. Rather, intragroup 
dynamics occur and exist through the combination of personalities, behaviours, and 
attitudes of the individual group members. 
 
In a systematic review of nonprofit governance models and their correlation with 
perceived organisational performance, the board–CEO relationship was the most 
captured out of 11 different types of intragroup dynamics (for more, see Schoenberg 
et al., 2016). Of course, this relationship has been documented in the sport governance 
literature for some time. For example, 20 years ago when influential sport 
management scholars (e.g., Auld, 1997; Inglis, 1997; Kikulis, Slack and Hinings, 
1995) were exploring the shift from ‘kitchen-table’ to more ‘executive office’ designs 
of the voluntary sport organisations, the examination of the dynamics between 
volunteers and the paid professionals shed light on the role delineation and the overall 
processes within these boards.  
Elsewhere, empirical research on board dynamics more generally has offered 
invaluable insights. For example, Doherty, Patterson and Van Bussel (2004) drew on 
the context of volunteer sport executive committees to examine the types and relative 
strength of perceived committee norms, finding that there are strong expectations for 
member behaviour, although those expectations only had a modest influence on the 
individual behaviours. In the same setting, Doherty and Carron (2003) found that 
cohesion among the committee members is greater when relating to a task aspect (the 
goals and objectives set to be met) rather than the social aspect of the group (the 
relationship among board members). One reason for the lack of cohesion within the 
board may be a type of conflict. This was the purpose of a study by Kerwin and 
Doherty (2010), which looked at the nature of intragroup conflict in nonprofit sport 
boards. The authors found that task, relationship and process conflict were negatively 
related to decision quality, satisfaction and commitment, while relationship conflict 
was the most influential variable on all three outcomes. 
While cohesion (or the lack thereof) and intragroup conflict affect perceived 
organisational performance, the commitment and involvement of board members also 
play a role. Hoye (2007) found that board members who have a higher sense of 
affective commitment work more productively at their own role and strive to meet 
their obligations. The issue of power may determine the board’s actual behaviour. 
While evaluating perceived board performance, the notion of power come across in a 
more implicit (e.g., Adriaanse and Schofield, 2013; Ferkins and Shilbury, 2012; 
Ferkins, Shilbury and McDonald, 2009; Papadimitriou, 1999) or explicit way (e.g., 
Hoye and Cuskelly, 2003; Sibson, 2010). This has prioritised the importance of 
authentic board leadership (Hoye and Cuskelly, 2003; Takos, Murray and O’Boyle, 
2018) as well as collective leadership between boards (Ferkins, Shilbury and 
O’Boyle, 2018). 
A common denominator concerning perceived organisational performance in 
all of the aforementioned organisational-focused sport governance literature is the 
dynamic of trust. Trust appears to be at play in the board-executive/CEO relationship 
generally (e.g., Hoye and Cuskelly, 2003; Koski and Heikkala, 1998; Thibault, Slack 
and Hinings, 1991); as an antecedent for cohesion inside the boards (Doherty and 
Carron, 2003); as a foundation for a shared vision between board members and 
employees (Winand, Rihoux, Robinson and Zintz, 2013); in relation to power 
dynamics (Hoye and Cuskelly, 2003); as a trigger for intragroup conflict (Kerwin and 
Doherty, 2010); or as a key contributor for authentic and collaborative leadership 
(Hoye and Cuskelly, 2003; Ferkins, Shilbury and O’Boyle, 2018; Takos et al., 2018).   
Notwithstanding the valuable insights these studies have offered on the role of 
trust (or lack thereof) on improving or inhibiting board processes, this is done mainly 
in relation to collaboration between boards (e.g., O’Boyle and Shilbury, 2016; 
O’Boyle, Shilbury and Ferkins, 2019 [in this Handbook]) or between board members 
(e.g., Takos et al., 2018), rather than specifically between board members and the 
executives/CEOs. Even when this is the case (see, e.g., Hoye and Cuskelly, 2003), the 
authors do not explicitly address the concept itself (and components thereof); rather, 
trust emerges as a critical dynamic for the perceived organisational performance. In 
this chapter, we build on these findings by unpacking the concept of trust as perceived 
by the charitable foundations’ executives/CEOs in relation to the board members, 
while sharing empirical insights about the reciprocity-based tactics these CEOs use 
towards trust building.          
 
THEORETICAL UNDERPININGS  
Reciprocal trust relationship and social exchange theory  
Trust is the willingness ‘to be vulnerable to the actions of another party’ (Mayer 
Davis and Schoorman, 1995, p. 712) as it is anticipated that the trustee (the individual 
who is trusted) will carry out tasks of significance to the trustor (the individual who 
trusts). The nature of trust is shaped by social exchange (Molm, Takahashi and 
Peterson, 2000). Social exchange theory (SET) (Blau, 1964) explains outcomes 
resulting from the interaction between individuals or organisations so that they should 
repay any favour received. Trust between parties is one of these outcomes rooted in 
reciprocal exchange (Molm et al., 2000). According to the reciprocity principle, it is 
expected the trustee will not abuse the trustor as they give direct or indirect benefits to 
one another (Lévi-Strauss, 1969; Molm et al., 2007). For example, the ‘parent’ team 
supports its charitable foundation with financial and/or contributions-in-kind with the 
view that the latter will juxtapose a positive image in the community where the former 
exists and operates (Anagnostopoulos et al., 2017; Kolyperas et al., 2016).  
SET considers continuous relationship management and information exchange 
as critical for success (Sia et al. 2008), and therefore reciprocal trust between parties 
as important for successful social exchanges (Ali Babar et al. 2007; Schoenherr et al. 
2015). Partners should communicate and work together in mutual support. Their 
relationship should be based on personal trust, integrity and honesty (Spence, 2016). 
However, partners may not return favours or not fully engage in reciprocal exchange. 
The uncertainty that surrounds social exchange encourages individuals to trust one 
another (Cook et al. 2013), which holds the risk of non-reciprocity (Molm 1994; 
Molm et al. 2007; Molm et al. 2000); that is, a partner giving but receiving little or 
nothing in return from the other party. Risk is integral to the reciprocal trust 
relationship and enables exchange partners to prove their trustworthiness to one 
another (Molm et al. 2007). Furthermore, the level of trust between parties is 
determined by the conditions that surround these exchanged relationships, such as 
partners’ own characteristics and reputation, the context of the relationship, and 
partners’ past experiences with each other (Ring, 1996). Direct experiences between 
partners influence how they view one another, their capabilities, and trustworthiness 
(Lewicki and Bunker 1996). The frequency and significance of exchanges, attributed 
intentions to the trustee, as well as individual interpretation of the success (or failure) 
of activities carried out together or for one another, are important factors that 
condition the trust relationship (Ariño, De la Torre and Ring 2001; Rousseau et al. 
1998). 
Against this background, we posit that SET and the concept of reciprocity 
offer a useful theoretical groundwork towards understanding how trust-building 
between the charitable foundations’ executives/CEOs and the board unfolds. It is 
hoped that such an understanding will help us shed further light on the CEO-board 
relationship and, thus, on the mechanisms for improving organisational performance. 
To do this, we draw on and integrate two conceptual frameworks to first unpack the 
components and dimensions of trust (Dietz and Hartog, 2006) and then exemplify the 
type of ‘exchange currencies’ (Cohen and Bradford, 1989) foundation 
executives/CEOs use towards trust building with the board.  
 
Components and dimensions of trust 
The five most common components of trust that have been identified in the literature 
are uncertainty, risk, vulnerability, expectations, and interdependence (Hudson, 2004; 
Rousseau et al., 1998).  
Uncertainty relates to the limited knowledge that the trustor has regarding 
whether the trustee will do what s/he has been trusted to do. Because such uncertainty 
entails the possibility of the trustee failing to meet his/her obligations to the trustor, 
the latter takes a risk in trusting the former. As Rousseau and his colleagues put it, 
‘uncertainty is the source of risk, and risk creates the opportunity for trust’ (1998, 
cited in Sharp et al., 2013, p. 1249). Although uncertainty can be the source of risk, 
one must also be willing to take on risk in order to trust somebody. Such willingness, 
expressed in the trust literature as vulnerability, exists because the trustor has certain 
expectations that the trustee will accomplish what has been agreed between the two 
parties. The last component for trusting relationships concerns interdependence 
between the trustor and trustee. According to Sharp et al. (2013), it is ‘a situation 
where the interests of at least one of the parties cannot be fulfilled without 
dependence on another party’ (p. 4).  
However, trust is not a simple ‘either/or’ matter (Dietz and Hartog, 2006, p. 
563), as ‘the degree to which one trusts another varies along a continuum of intensity’ 
(Williams, 2001, p. 379). Accordingly, Figure 15.2 summarises the dimensions of 
trust as identified in the relevant literature. 
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Corroborating previous studies on sport governance that highlighted the 
critical importance of trust in improving board processes (e.g., Hoye and Cuskelly, 
2003; O’Boyle and Shilbury, 2016; O’Boyle et al., 2019; Takos et al., 2018), we posit 
that the degree to which trust exists between the foundations executives/CEOs and the 
board (particularly with those members that come from the ‘parent’ team) will partly 
determine the social and business benefits resulted from COP. However, such trust 
building does not just happen. We now look at the tactics used for trust building to 
occur.    
‘Exchanging currencies’ for trust building  
Yukl and Falbe (1990) argued that one of the most important determinants of 
managerial effectiveness is success in influencing subordinates, peers and superiors. 
Given the presence in the board of influential organisational actors coming from the 
‘parent’ team – something that renders the independence of the charitable foundation 
at least ‘blurry’ – employed influence tactics from the executives/CEOs of the latter 
require a well-thought-through approach. This is particularly so because foundation 
executives/CEOs are trying to influence board members without the formal authority 
to do so. According to Cohen and Bradford (1989), in the absence of formal authority, 
influence is acquired through principles of reciprocity. As stated earlier, reciprocity is 
‘probably the best known exchange rule in SET’ (Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005, p. 
875), and the latter is amongst the most influential theories for understanding 
workplace behaviour (ibid.). 
As previous research has shown (e.g., Anagnostopoulos et al., 2017; 
Kolyperas et al., 2016), foundation executives/CEOs are trying to secure as large and 
as consistent a buy-in as possible from the board members affiliated with the ‘parent’ 
team in exchange for contributing towards the latter’s business-related objectives. 
This endeavour is based on the belief that performance (in business and social terms 
alike) cannot be advanced by either the foundation (being ‘independent’) or the 
‘parent’ team (being ‘dependent’) in isolation; instead, for these executives/CEOs the 
defining characteristic of social exchange is interdependence (Molm, 1994), which 
involves mutual and complementary arrangements (Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005). 
This point reminds us the concept of trust, with interdependence being one of trust’s 
main components. This is not surprising given that trust has been identified as the 
critical social exchange mediator (Molm, Takahashi and Peterson, 2000).  
Cohen and Bradford (1989) argued that in interpersonal exchanges within 
organisational contexts, ‘exchange rates’ (p. 10) are not restricted to common 
monetary currencies and that agents (in our case, the foundation executives/CEOs) 
must broaden the range of what can be exchanged between themselves and their 
targets (here, the board of trustees). Cohen and Bradford (1989) used the metaphor of 
‘currencies’ to formulate five categories that illustrate what might be important to 
agents and targets during the process of organisational influence (see Table 15.1).  
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Several currencies can be traded across several categories depending on what the 
agent is seeking to achieve by the target’s ‘involvement’. For example, a foundation 
executive may influence a board member coming from the ‘parent’ team by stressing 
that the latter’s involvement in a particular COP will have significance to the team’s 
wider strategic positioning (an inspiration-related currency), which can aid in his/her 
promotion when the opportunity arises (position-related currency), by the foundation 
executive having openly expressed his/her appreciation and indebtedness to this 
person in various board meetings (personal-related currency). Further, we will 
empirically demonstrate what sort of exchange currencies the foundations’ executives 
(mostly) use with the board members to get closer to what Dietz and Hartog (2006) 
referred to as ‘identification-based trust’. But first, a brief account on the method 
employed. 
 
METHOD 
Research setting 
In this chapter, we communicate outcomes of a larger study1 that employed an 
interpretive approach and used semi-structured interviews for data collection and 
analysis. Such an exploratory analysis was undertaken through views expressed from 
executives/CEOs responsible for the day-to-day management of the charitable 
foundations of their respective football clubs.  
The charitable foundations are what Anheier (2001) calls ‘operative 
foundations’; that is, organisations that implement and coordinate social and 
community-based projects. Consequently, although the study recognises that the 
social responsibility of the contemporary businesses should not be limited to 
community-related projects alone delivered by a company’s charitable ‘arm’ (for 
more on this argument see Walzel et al., 2018), it aligns itself with the 
conceptualisation proposed by Rowe, Karg and Sherry (2018), which integrates 
diverse notions regarding the social involvement of sport organisations. Within it, 
community-oriented practice (COP) refers to: 
‘the range of discretionary and externally-focused activities delivered by (or in 
partnership with) professional sport teams that have specific, targeted, positive 
impacts on community stakeholders. Such benefits may span, but are not limited to, 
the focus areas of education, health, social cohesion, disability, gender, livelihoods, 
peace and sport participation.’ (p. 14) 
 
With this definition in mind, the current study is populated by the charitable 
foundations of the top two divisions of English football: the 20 clubs in Premier 
League and the 24 clubs in the Football League Championship. English football was 
                                                          
1 This is the first author’s doctoral thesis, which examined how charitable foundation managers make 
decisions about the formulation and implementation of CSR-related programmes. Additional 
interviews were carried out in 2016.  
chosen as the context because that is this country where the strongest institutionalised 
forms of COP have evolved (Hovemann et al., 2011; Kolyperas et al., 2016).  
Interview guide and procedures 
Table 15.2 provides an overview of the 28 interviews that were conducted among a 
sample of charitable foundation executives/CEOs between 2009 and 2016. The 
interview guide was flexible to the direction of the conversation. Examples of the 
initial questions during the interviews included: Tell me about the job you do here; 
What do you think of COP?; Share with me your beliefs regarding COP issues in 
relation to your job; What is the role of the foundation here?; How does COP 
‘happen’ here?; What facilitates (or inhibits) the application of COP here?; What do 
you think COP means for the ‘parent’ football club?; How influential has the board 
been for the job you do here?; Is there anything that would make your job easier or 
more effective? 
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The interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim. Following transcription, 
member checks were conducted (Newman, 2000) and appropriate changes were made 
on three occasions. Informants were guaranteed anonymity and no names were 
recorded on the transcriptions during the research. Interview transcripts were assigned 
numbers and letters that correlated to each interview (for example, ChF1). The 
numeral indicated the specific participant, recognisable only to themselves and the 
first author.  
All data were manually coded and analysis was conducted using the constant 
comparative approach, as synthesised by Spiggle (1994), through the seven-stage 
process of categorisation, abstraction, comparison, dimensionalisation, integration, 
iteration, and refutation. In the present chapter, however, we offer a thick description 
of these findings in the form of ‘data extracts’ to demonstrate the main components 
and dimensions of trust (Dietz and Hartog, 2006) as well as the reciprocity-based 
tactics ( ‘exchange rates’) used by these executives to influence the board (Cohen and 
Bradford, 1989) and ultimately gain their trust.  
 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
On the role of trust  
As stated above, trust is not a simple ‘either/or’ matter. As per Figure 15.2, on the 
extreme left of the continuum, Rousseau et al. (1998, p. 399) discussed the degree of 
‘deterrence-based trust’, which chiefly manifests distrust rather than trust. Therefore, 
this dimension of trust encompasses none of the five common components of trust 
discussed earlier. In other words, from the trustor’s perspective (in our case, board 
members from the ‘parent’ team), there is no risk, no spark of vulnerability, and 
therefore no expectation of a trustee’s goodwill. When distrust exists, compliance is 
guaranteed through external sanctions and force (Dietz and Hartog, 2006). In the 
present study, distrust – as conceptualised in the literature – did not seem to be at 
play, and managerial decision-making in the charitable foundations was not affected 
by ‘sanctions and force’ (partly thanks to the independent status these organisations 
enjoyed). As one foundation executive/CEO put it:  
‘If it is a major decision, then constitutionally the “parent” club has the right to veto. 
But it hasn’t used that at any point; and I can’t imagine any reason why they would 
unless they felt that the reputation of the club was at risk.’ (ChF8) 
 
This is an interesting point considering that past literature has shown that to optimise 
performance the board needs a level of distrust to adequately perform its monitoring 
duties (Reid and Turbide, 2012), which suggests the need for a balance between trust 
and distrust (Bradshaw and Fredette, 2009).  
Neither can ‘calculus-based’ trust, coined by Lewicki and Bunker (1996), be 
considered as real trust because the trustor approaches the relationship from a purely 
cost-benefit perspective and with a continuing deep a priori suspicion of the other (the 
trustee) (Dietz and Hartog, 2006). A foundation executive/CEO expressed this sort of 
suspicion:  
 
‘For some within the “parent” club, we may exist because there is a statutory 
obligation to have a community organisation [...] In fact, one of the Board members 
doesn’t even consider us a real charitable organisation; for this person we are a mere 
political gimmick [...].’ (ChF9) 
 
Calculus-based trust results more from macro-level evidence than from an 
individual relationship between trustee and trustor (see Figure 15.2). For example, in 
the relationship between foundation paid staff and board members that represent the 
‘parent’ team, calculus-based trust primarily results from the ‘unproblematic’ 
relationship between trustors (team) and trustees (foundation). One participant 
illuminated this kind of trust as follows:  
‘[...] I am sure there is [trust] because of our track-record and what we have 
delivered. Financially it’s wiping its face, operationally it’s not causing any problems, 
PR is going well, so why would they worry?’ (ChF3) 
 
According to Lewicki and Bunker (1996), so-called ‘real trust’ (see ‘threshold’ in 
Figure 15.2) begins when the trustor stops being suspicious and is confidently 
persuaded that the trustee has the competence needed to cope with the task. In other 
words, trust is built upon the trustor’s prior knowledge (hence ‘knowledge-based’) 
that, despite any uncertainties and entailed risks, history has proven that expectations 
will be met. Over time, however, trust can become more subjective and emotional. 
Rousseau et al. (1998) referred to this strong trustor confidence in the other party’s 
ability to meet expectations as ‘relational-based trust’. Here, it is the quality of the 
relationship that defines and determines trust between the two parties rather than the 
actual trustee’s specific behaviours (Dietz and Hartog, 2006). The importance of 
having (or developing) ‘relational-based’ trust has been highlighted as a crucial 
prerequisite for, for example, maintaining the quality of delivery, as the excerpt below 
illustrates:  
 
‘I took over the project and operations manager role in 2004. I had a [sic] club’s 
chairman at the time who basically took the higher strategic role of the Foundation, 
but I worked in partnership with him. Got to a point in 2008 when his direction and 
my direction were slightly different; there was a quality-quantity conundrum going 
on: Do we go for – we have grown, we had 52 full-time members of staff by this point 
and it was a 2.3-million turnover a year. And the [sic] chairman’s view was that we go 
down a quantity route; we put people who may be qualified to deliver certain 
programmes to make sure that we had the money to service the base that was 100,000 
a year salaries. My view was much more, long turnaround – I had been there for 11 
years building relationships with schools, building relationships with the organisations 
that was a trust relation. It was a quality relation: If you don’t deliver quality then you 
might be around for 12 months, but you certainly won’t be around the next year. So 
actually, we agree to disagree and I took voluntary redundancy at the time.’ (ChF2) 
 
The right extreme of the trust continuum (Figure 15. 2) might come close to what 
Anagnostopoulos et al. (2014) referred to as ‘absolute’ trust. However, in hindsight 
what was expressed as ‘absolute’ may have also encompassed a certain ‘lack of 
interest’ from the trustor’s point of view. Conversely, Lewicki and Bunker (1996, p. 
122) referred in ‘identification-based trust’ to an identity common to both parties 
(trustor and trustee) in which ‘each can represent the other’s interests with their full 
confidence’ (Dietz and Hartog, 2006, p. 564). However, in the present context, and as 
recent studies have shown (Anagnostopoulos et al., 2017; Kolyperas et al., 2016), a 
sort of dysfunctional affiliation between the foundations and the ‘parent’ teams exists 
that requires manoeuvring (see Anagnostopoulos et al., 2014) to move closer to what 
trust literature refers to as identification-based trust.  
Thus, it appears that the two extreme ends of the trust continuum – if 
applicable at all – may only constitute rare cases within English football. The 
foundation executives/CEOs’ (frequently) long-standing service could favour the 
establishment of relational-based trust with board members from the ‘parent’ team. 
Over the last decade or so, however, changes in football club ownership (Walters and 
Hamil, 2010) have inevitably brought in new personnel at the executive level and 
possibly differentiated staff turnover in the organisations as a whole. These factors 
may render the establishment of ‘relational-based’ trust unrealistic. Although trust in 
relation to COP in English football may have passed the so-called ‘trust threshold’, 
the possibility of relational-based trust between foundation executives/CEOs and 
board members from the ‘parent’ team in particular should not be dismissed. The 
following excerpts largely indicate that knowledge-based rather than relational-based 
trust seems to be the normative model:       
 
‘I wouldn’t have existed here, survived here if they didn’t believe in it, too. And that’s 
actually been through three ownerships, that’s continued to three ownerships while I 
have been here. So we have maintained that, and developed it, and I am absolutely 
convinced that at every single level there is great pride in that.’ (ChF2) 
 
‘I think I am in here – we are fortunate – we have board members from the club who 
can see the benefit of what we are trying to do. I think they understand that. I think 
sometimes there will be some owners who embrace it more than others. And I have 
been here for a long time, so I have seen quite a lot of ownerships. So I have seen 
different levels of commitment to what we do.’ (ChF1) 
 
‘In a space of two years we have had three different owners; the most recent owners – 
obviously, there hasn’t really been time to see how that’s going to impact – but the 
people who are working for him have been down here [at the Foundation] and they 
looked really positive about what we do. So I am hoping that’s going to remain as 
positive; there is no reason why not, because I think they can see the difference it 
makes.’ (ChF3) 
 
Building particularly on ‘knowledge-based’ trust, the foundation executives/CEOs 
emphasised their entitlement to trust throughout this study, based on their 
organisations’ quality in delivering COP that may have had positive social and 
business results. The trustees (the foundation executives/CEOs) emphasised their 
trustworthiness – that is, their quality – in performing those tasks for which they had 
been assigned responsibility. 
However, it must be underlined that the literature has viewed trust and 
trustworthiness as related yet distinct concepts (Hardin, 2002). Sharp et al. (2012, p. 
4) drew upon the seminal work of Mayer et al. (1995) to explain that trustworthiness 
comprises three components: ability (the trustor’s perception of the trustee’s 
knowledge, skills and competencies), benevolence (the extent to which a trustor 
believes that a trustee will act in the trustor’s best interests) and integrity (the extent to 
which the trustor perceives the trustee to be acting in accordance with the trustor’s 
values and norms).  
Our findings suggest that all three components of trustworthiness are at play 
from the foundation executives/CEOs’ point of view. For example, ability is notably 
supported through facts that charitable foundation’s performance through COP has a 
positive social impact. Furthermore, the components of benevolence and integrity are 
both expressed through what Anagnostopoulos et al. (2014) called ‘safeguarding’, in 
which foundation executives/CEOs greatly appreciate that their organisations’ actions 
also should serve the ‘parent’ club’s business objectives. The following extracts 
illustrate these two components of trustworthiness:    
 
‘I think our [sic] chairman here understands that there is a bit of knowledge about 
community interaction and I am genuinely thinking he respects the fact that such 
knowledge puts everything we do in the right direction for all parties.’ (ChF5) 
[BENEVOLENCE] 
 
‘It is important that the people who are in charge of the brand – and amongst them it 
is me, of course – understand the brand is there because a lot of people have secured 
that brand for a long time; so I walk in the footsteps of legends and I am looking after 
that while I am here; so, if I want to move on and to keep the brand what it is when I 
leave, but stronger, then I have to secure that.’ (ChF14) [INTEGRITY] 
 
We have acknowledged the importance of distinguishing trust from trustworthiness, 
as the literature on socio-psychological conceptualisations of trust suggests (Sharp et 
al., 2012). Foundation executives/CEOs wish to be trusted more by board members 
(especially those members that come from the ‘parent’ team), in the belief that this 
will facilitate their decision-making regarding COP, and subsequently the 
foundation’s performance in social and business terms alike. The supply of this 
‘missing’ trust depends heavily on these organisations’ distinctive features 
(trustworthiness). Our findings show that the time has come for trustworthiness to be 
regarded as a standard among team’s charitable foundations; yet, key board members 
are not currently offering the stimulus (trust) that would enable foundation 
executives/CEOs to enhance foundations’ performance even more. These executives 
can build trust through emphasising trustworthiness, which can occur by employing 
certain exchange currencies.  
 
Trust building through ‘exchanging currencies’ 
As shown in Table 15.1, there are five main ‘exchange currencies’ categories, which 
illustrate what might be important to agents and targets during the process of 
organisational influence (Cohen and Bradford, 1989). Without dismissing the 
possibility of several currencies working together, it has become evident in the 
present study that reciprocity is largely sought through task-related currencies 
(resources, assistance, cooperation and information). Emphasis on task-related 
currencies by the foundation executives/CEOs against board members from the 
‘parent’ team seems to be in line with past research on board dynamics in sport. For 
example, the task aspect (as opposed to the social aspect) may ensure greater board 
cohesion (Doherty and Carron, 2003), whereas task-based conflict (as opposed to 
relationship one) does not affect decision quality, satisfaction and commitment 
(Kerwin and Doherty, 2010). 
INSERT FIGURE 15.3 ABOUT HERE 
Crucially for trust building, the foundation executives/CEOs’ tactics seem to 
be in line with the four principles of exchange process suggested by Cohen and 
Bradford (1989). First, these executives think of the board members that represent the 
team as potential allies rather than adversaries. Second, they know that their ‘targeted 
allies’ – here the board members affiliated to the ‘parent’ team – exist and operate in a 
peculiar and challenging business environment (Chadwick et al., 2018) and have their 
own objectives to meet (“[...] the reason why that happens because their people are 
incentivised to put their wages on commission” (ChF9)). Third, foundation 
executives/CEOs are aware that they – and by extension their organisations – possess 
‘currencies’ that can be valuable for the ‘parent’ team and may be exchanged for 
additional buy-in. As noted, this additional buy-in is necessary in order for 
identification-based trust to occur; something that ultimately boosts social and 
business performance. Fourth, foundation executives/CEOs have also started 
understanding the exchange transaction itself – albeit at various degrees of 
effectiveness – and so win-win outcomes can be achieved. One participant recognised 
that the ‘exchange transaction itself’ is one element that can be further developed 
from the foundation executives/CEOs’ perspective.   
       
‘They [the ‘parent’ team and its members that represent it in the foundation’s Board] 
are probably not interested in things that you or I might be interested in here. They 
probably are interested in how many more fans come to the game and how many 
more people buy burgers and more people buy shirts, media shows [...] I think our 
smartest schemes now are beginning to look for ways they can do that. So they can go 
back to them and just show look, it might be something on the back of some 
sponsorship deal. We brought you the sponsor because they wouldn’t sponsor you as 
a club but they will sponsor the community initiative. Then we will get a bigger 
partnership for the club by doing these schools work we have brought; extra 10,000 
tickets over this season which brought you whatever the income […] I think that’s 
what they [the Foundations] need to do a little bit smarter.’ (ChF24) 
 
One of the key points in Cohen and Bradford’s (1989) fourth principle of the 
exchange process is that success in influencing others is both situational and 
relationship-dependent (between the agent and the target); therefore, overuse of the 
same technique can diminish success rates. Table 15.3 below offers some illustrative 
examples of how the foundation executives/CEOs use task-related currencies to 
enhance their trustworthiness, and hopefully gain additional trust from key board 
members so that more and better COP occurs and enhanced social and business 
performance can be achieved.   
INSERT TABLE 15.3 ABOUT HERE 
Space constraints prevent us from determining here the weight that each individual 
task-related currency may bear in the foundation executives/CEOs’ trust-building 
process. However, it is useful to observe that relationship-based and personal-related 
currencies are lacking in the foundation executives/CEOs’ trust building tactics with 
board members that are affiliated with the ‘parent’ team. Rational persuasion requires 
factual evidence and is currently much more in use with external communication 
(outside the board), which concerns social performance, rather than the internal 
communication (inside and/or with the board), which relates to business performance 
(Anagnostopoulos et al., 2017). 
CONCLUDING NOTES 
This work allows the generation of a context-specific conceptual framework presented 
in the form of a model (see Figure 15.3) and related to a particular board dynamic; 
namely, the board-executive relationship. The study contributes to this important 
board dynamic not only by unpacking the concept of trust, but also by delineating the 
development of managerial political skills involved in the various tactical moves 
practiced in order for COP to not just happen, but to attain higher levels of efficacy. 
Therefore, the current study draws on the concept of reciprocity and social exchange 
theory and reveals the necessary micro-organisational processes that foundation 
executives/CEOs must go through in order to enhance their organisations’ 
performance.  
Due largely to their knowledge of the task for which they are responsible, 
foundation executives/CEOs seem to enjoy a certain degree of trust from key board 
members regarding the formulation and implementation of COP. These key board 
members mainly consist of decision-makers in the ‘parent’ team who – with varying 
degrees of directness – influence the capacity (in-kind support, funding, sponsorships, 
etc.) that these foundations have for the strategic implementation of COP. As we have 
shown, however, the foundation executives/CEOs perceive that these key board 
members do not currently offer enough of this extrinsic stimulus (that is, trust) to 
enable the former to make decisions that would develop impact to its full potential. 
One way for an organisation to build up (further) trust is through emphasising its own 
trustworthiness by concretely highlighting its ability, benevolence and integrity. By 
drawing on task-related exchange currencies, we have empirically shown how this is 
done. 
We have also suggested that foundation executives/CEOs’ quest for trust 
building is ultimately spurred by the desire to increase the impact – social and 
business alike – of their various COP. ‘Increasing the impact’ means better 
performance, yet better performance assumes additional resources, which will, in turn, 
increase the capacity of these charitable foundations. One way of securing additional 
resources is to increase the degree to which foundation executives/CEOs are trusted 
by the key board members who influence the implementation of COP (for example, 
through funding). The more vigorously these foundations demonstrate their impact on 
both social and business-related matters, the more trust they are likely to receive. To 
this end, we propose that the level of trust between charitable foundations and key 
board members that comes from the ‘parent’ team will be positively related to social 
and/or business performance. 
However, it is important to underline that social performance plays the 
dominant role in foundation executives/CEOs strive for gaining additional trust, not 
least because a charity’s principal objectives are social in nature. As literature has 
empirically shown (e.g., Babiak and Wolfe, 2009; Kolyperas et al., 2016), managerial 
decision-making within these organisations also entails a belief that COP can actually 
contribute to business performance. Although this belief is authentic, it is also 
tendentious in that it is derived from the executives/CEOs’ confidence that any 
evident impact on the ‘parent’ team’ business performance can subsequently lead to 
higher social performance in the foundation. This would follow on from the team’s 
increased buy-in, which could be, in turn, translated into higher commitment and 
consequently the allocation of the additional resources necessary for social 
performance to excel. 
In conclusion, despite the inevitable limits of this study’s contextual 
parameters and methodological choices, it is hoped that its insights – that is, the 
tentative conceptual framework and its associative concepts – can open up the 
discussion of board dynamics in the context of team charitable foundations, by 
indirectly examining COP too. To this end, we advocate that, given the fractured, 
complex and vague nature of CSR in general (Walzel et al.,, 2018) and COP in 
particular (Rowe et al.,2018), as well as the intersections of governance and social 
responsibility (see Robertson, Walzel and Shilbury, 2019 in this Handbook), more 
micro-theorisation on governance-related processes that facilitate socially responsible 
practices may represent the best way of moving towards a better understanding of not 
only the CSR/COP concepts themselves, but also the board dynamics that are at play 
for the enhancement of the organisational performance. We hope that the present 
chapter helps to provide a foundation that will facilitate just that. 
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 Figure 15.1: Governance in professional teams’ charitable foundations 
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